Local representation and strategic voting: evidence from electoral boundary reforms by Saarimaa, Tuukka & Tukiainen, Janne
 LOCAL REPRESENTATION AND STRATEGIC VOTING: EVIDENCE FROM 
ELECTORAL BOUNDARY REFORMS  
Tuukka Saarimaa, Janne Tukiainen 
Document de treball de l’IEB 2013/32 
 
 Fiscal Federalism 
  
 
Documents de Treball de l’IEB 2013/32 
LOCAL REPRESENTATION AND STRATEGIC VOTING:  
EVIDENCE FROM ELECTORAL BOUNDARY REFORMS 
 
 
Tuukka Saarimaa, Janne Tukiainen 
 
 
 
 
The IEB research program in Fiscal Federalism aims at promoting research in the 
public finance issues that arise in decentralized countries. Special emphasis is put on 
applied research and on work that tries to shed light on policy-design issues. Research 
that is particularly policy-relevant from a Spanish perspective is given special 
consideration. Disseminating research findings to a broader audience is also an aim of 
the program. The program enjoys the support from the IEB-Foundation and the IEB-
UB Chair in Fiscal Federalism funded by Fundación ICO, Instituto de Estudios Fiscales 
and Institut d’Estudis Autonòmics. 
 
The Barcelona Institute of Economics (IEB) is a research centre at the University of 
Barcelona which specializes in the field of applied economics. Through the IEB-
Foundation, several private institutions (Applus, Abertis, Ajuntament de Barcelona, 
Diputació de Barcelona, Gas Natural and La Caixa) support several research programs. 
 
 
Postal Address: 
Institut d’Economia de Barcelona 
Facultat d’Economia i Empresa 
Universitat de Barcelona 
C/ Tinent Coronel Valenzuela, 1-11 
(08034) Barcelona, Spain 
Tel.: + 34 93 403 46 46 
Fax: + 34 93 403 98 32 
ieb@ub.edu 
http://www.ieb.ub.edu 
 
 
The IEB working papers represent ongoing research that is circulated to encourage 
discussion and has not undergone a peer review process. Any opinions expressed here 
are those of the author(s) and not those of IEB. 
  
 
Documents de Treball de l’IEB 2013/32 
LOCAL REPRESENTATION AND STRATEGIC VOTING:  
EVIDENCE FROM ELECTORAL BOUNDARY REFORMS 
*
 
 
 
Tuukka Saarimaa, Janne Tukiainen 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT:  We use Finnish local election voting data to analyze whether voters value 
local representation and act strategically to guarantee it. To identify such preferences and 
behavior, we exploit municipal mergers as natural experiments, which increase the 
number of candidates and parties available to voters and intensify political competition. 
Using difference-in-differences strategy, we find that voters in merged municipalities 
start to concentrate their votes to local candidates despite the larger choice set, whereas 
the vote distributions in the municipalities that did not merge remain the same. Moreover, 
the concentration effect is clearly larger in municipalities that are less likely to gain local 
representation in the post-merger councils. We also find that the effect increases both as 
the geographical distance and income heterogeneity between merging municipalities 
increases. We interpret these results as evidence of both preferences for local 
representation and strategic voting.   
 
 
JEL Codes:   C21, C23, D72, H73, H77 
Keywords:   Electoral boundary reform, local representation, municipality mergers, 
strategic voting. 
 
 
 
Tuukka Saarimaa 
Government Institute for Economic Research 
VATT 
P.O.Box 1279 
FI-00101 Helsinki, Finland 
Email: tuukka.saarimaa@vatt.fi 
 
Janne Tukiainen 
Government Institute for Economic 
Research VATT & Helsinki Center of 
Economic Research (HECER) 
P.O.Box 1279 
FI-00101 Helsinki, Finland 
Email: janne.tukiainen@vatt.fi 
 
 
                                                 
*
 We thank Stefano DellaVigna, Essi Eerola and seminar participants at EPSA 2013, FEEAM 2013, 
JSBE, HECER, IEB, IIPF 2013, Oslo, PEARLE 2012, RES 2013 and VATT for useful discussions. 
Oskari Harjunen provided excellent research assistance. Janne Tukiainen is grateful to the Emil Aaltonen 
Foundation for financial support. 
 1   Introduction 
 
Received literature shows that representation in a legislative body matters for the 
geographic distribution of centralized spending and the type of spending in general.
1
 For 
several reasons, representation should also matter at the local level. If households sort 
into local communities based on their preferences concerning local public goods as 
suggested by Tiebout (1956), a local candidate is likely to share voters’ preferences over 
the service-tax bundle that the public sector offers.
2
 In addition to the type and level of 
local services, voters’ preferences are likely to be heterogeneous with respect to the 
geographic location of the services. Moreover, local governments cater to these 
heterogeneous preferences from a common pool of funds, which implies that voters 
need an own representative to ensure their own share of the spending (Weingast et al. 
1981) and to prevent others from spending too much (Baron and Ferejohn 1987 and 
1989).  
In this paper, we analyze the value of local political representation to voters by 
studying how voters in local municipal elections reacted to a recent wave of 
municipality mergers in Finland.
3
 A municipal merger can be seen as an electoral 
boundary reform that changes the set of voters that are able to vote for a given 
candidate, the set of candidates competing against each other and the number of seats 
over which they compete. These boundary reforms create an interesting set-up to study 
voters’ behavior and their preferences for local representation for a number of reasons.  
First, because in the merged municipalities voters can also vote for new non-local 
candidates, mergers can be seen as an expansion of the voters’ choice set. If the location 
of candidates is not relevant to voters, at least some voters should find a better match 
                                                 
1
 See e.g. Knight (2004, 2005 and 2008) and Albouy (2013) for theoretical and empirical evidence on the 
geographic distribution of centralized spending and Pande (2003), Besley et al. (2004) and Chattopadhyay 
and Duflo (2004) concerning spending types that benefit disadvantaged and minority groups. 
2
 Similarly, in the spirit of Alesina and Spolaore (1997), local government borders could have been 
originally drawn in such a way that within jurisdiction preference heterogeneity is smaller than between 
jurisdiction heterogeneity. More precisely, in Alesina and Spolaore (1997) jurisdiction size is a tradeoff 
between preference heterogeneity and economies of scale in producing the public good. 
3
 A related branch of research is interested in the effects of electoral rules on voting. See e.g. Blais et al. 
(2011) and Fiva and Folke (2012). These papers do not analyze changes in geographic electoral 
boundaries. Furthermore, redistricting and voting has been studied previously in national elections. E.g. 
Ansolabehere et al. (2000) study incumbency advantage and Hayes and McKee (2009) turnout. Hyytinen, 
Saarimaa and Tukiainen (2013) study how the expected change in councilors’ seat competitiveness 
affected their ex ante voting behavior over the mergers analyzed in this paper.    
2
 from the new larger set of alternatives. If so, the vote distribution of a municipality 
should be less concentrated after a merger as votes are scattered to a larger number of 
candidates. On the other hand, if voters prefer local over non-local candidates, they 
should keep on voting them regardless of the new choices available. This, in turn, 
should result either in no change or in a more concentrated vote distribution depending 
on the number of local candidates in the post-merger elections. According to a standard 
revealed preference argument, f we observe a voter choosing a local candidate over a 
non-local candidate when both are available, we can interpret this choice as revealing a 
preference for local over non-local candidates. 
Second, by increasing political competition, a merger profoundly affects the 
extent of local representation, i.e. the number of representatives from voters’ pre-merger 
municipalities in the post-merger municipality council. If voters value local 
representation and act strategically, i.e. take into account election probabilities, voters 
should concentrate votes to those local candidates that have a genuine chance of 
winning a seat from a non-local candidate.
4
 To sum up, mergers are likely to lead to 
vote concentration if voters are sincere and value local representation. Moreover, vote 
concentration should be stronger if voters are strategic. Previous empirical evidence 
concerning valuation for local representation is largely missing in the literature. Neither 
do we have much evidence based on natural experiments concerning strategic voting.  
Our econometric analysis exploits the fact that in the Finnish municipal elections 
council seats are allocated using the open-list D’Hondt method.  For our purposes, the 
essential feature of the Finnish system is that each voter gives a single vote to a single 
candidate, and thus, voters (not parties) decide which candidates are elected from a 
given list.
5
 Furthermore, municipalities are divided into polling districts that are used 
for vote counting and voting location purposes only and do not change due to a merger. 
We observe votes at the individual candidate and polling district level both before 
(2004) and after (2008) the merger wave. By using polling districts we are able 
decompose a merged municipality into the original pre-merger municipalities and trace 
                                                 
4
 This means that some voters abandoned their preferred “sincere” choice because they wanted to 
influence the elections outcome. I.e. instead of voting for their preferred candidate they voted for a 
candidate with a legitimate chance of winning a seat. More empirical evidence on strategic voting can be 
found e.g. in Cox (1997), Fujiwara (2011) and Kawai and Watanabe (2013). 
5
 Furthermore, voters cannot vote for a party without specifying a candidate. In the case of closed-lists, 
our analysis would not be possible, because parties choose the ranking of individual candidates.  
3
 back the vote distributions of candidates at the pre-merger municipal level for both 
elections. These features of the data facilitate a difference-in-differences (DID) analysis 
where the unit of observation is the pre-merger municipality and voting data come from 
elections before and after the merger wave. In addition, we calculate counterfactual 
election outcomes based on the pre-merger vote distributions and candidates while 
treating the mergers as new electoral districts. This gives us a measure of the intensity 
of the treatment a municipality receives due to a merger in terms of expected electoral 
success when there are no behavioral responses by voters or candidates.  
We measure vote concentration by the maximum candidate vote share and the 
Herfindahl index of the candidates’ vote shares. Our key empirical finding is that the 
vote distributions of the merged municipalities are clearly more concentrated in the 
post-merger elections than before, whereas there is no change among municipalities that 
did not merge. More importantly, the concentration effect is clearly stronger in 
municipalities that are less likely to gain local representation in the post-merger 
councils based on counterfactual elections. In fact, we find no vote concentration among 
the merged municipalities that did not expect to lose representation (typically large 
municipalities merging with smaller partners), but find substantial vote concentration 
among municipalities that expect a substantial loss (typically small municipalities 
merging with larger partners). This happened despite the fact that the voters in the 
merged municipalities had much a larger set of candidates and parties to choose from 
after a merger.  
We also show that voters were quite successful in their efforts. In our data, 20 out 
of the 120 merged municipalities would not have gained any representation into the 
post-merger council in our counterfactual elections. In reality, these municipalities 
gained on average over two representatives (maximum being 6) and only one of these 
municipalities failed to gain a single one.  
Finally, we are interested in why voters value local representation. To this end, we 
analyze whether the observed vote concentration patterns are consistent with voters’ 
preferences in terms of local service-tax bundles and location of local services. We find 
that the effect of our treatment on vote concentration increases both as the geographical 
distance and income heterogeneity between merging municipalities increases. The first 
result suggests that voters care about the geographic location of public services and the 
4
 second that there is between municipality preference heterogeneity over services. While 
there is a vast literature showing that households value local services, to our knowledge, 
this is the first paper to offer plausible causal evidence concerning preferences for local 
representation that uses actual voting data, instead of survey or house price data.
6
 The 
latter observation can be seen as evidence of Tiebout sorting.  
The mergers in our analysis were voluntarily decided at the local level and they 
may be a non-randomly selected sample, which raises some issues concerning validity 
of DID. Reassuringly, our results are highly robust and valid in the light of the usual 
DID common pre-trend tests, placebo regressions based on earlier elections (1996 and 
2000), alternative control group (municipalities that considered merging, but eventually 
did not), controlling for observables and within merger group analysis.  
There are several competing explanations for our findings and we need to 
carefully consider whether we are actually observing a strategic response from the 
voters to changes in political competition and whether this response is related to local 
representation. The confounders include behavioral responses from candidates and 
parties, informational advantage of local candidates and change in type of candidate that 
voters prefer due to a merger, and change in the amount of available local candidates. 
We discuss these issues at length and provide additional econometric evidence that 
supports our interpretation in a separate subsection. Most importantly, we can replicate 
our concentration results using only the subset of candidates that we can identify as 
being local, because they ran in both the pre- and post-merger elections. This analysis 
effectively rules out many of these concerns as we elaborate below. We conclude from 
our findings that voters value local representation so that the geographic location is an 
important attribute of a candidate. Our findings are also consistent with strategic voting 
in order to increase local representation.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a short 
overview of the institutional setting of Finland concerning municipalities, election 
mechanisms and the merger process. The section also contains theoretical arguments on 
why local representation may matter to voters and how this should be reflected in voting 
behavior. In Section 3, we summarize our data shortly and we present our econometric 
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 A typical approach in the literature has been to show that the quality of neighborhood services 
capitalizes to house values. See e.g. Black and Machin (2011) and the references therein. 
5
 strategy and results. We discuss the results and possible confounders in Section 4 and 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2   Institutional background, local representation and voting  
2.1   Why local representation matters?  
 
In Finland, public goods and services are provided by two tiers of government where 
municipalities constitute the local level. Because of the variety of tasks assigned to 
them, municipalities are of considerable importance to the whole economy. The GDP 
share of municipality spending is roughly 18 percent and they employ around 20 
percent of the total workforce. The bulk of Finnish municipalities’ expenditures come 
from producing social and health care services and primary education. In most of these 
services, in addition to costs, quantity and quality, also the location of services should 
be relevant for the citizens. Municipalities fund their spending mostly through their own 
revenue sources. The most important revenue source is the flat municipal income tax 
which the municipalities can set freely. A central government grant system consisting of 
20 percent of overall revenue is used to equalize local cost and revenue disparities.   
Municipal councils are the main seat of power in Finnish municipal decision 
making. Due to extensive tasks and power in setting taxes, municipal councils are 
relatively powerful compared to local politicians in many other countries. Councils’ 
importance implies that also local political representation in the council is important and 
for a variety of reasons it may be particularly important after a merger. Even though the 
municipal council makes all the decisions, a municipal board has an important 
preparatory role. Political parties gain representation both in the council and in the 
municipal board proportional to their electoral success. 
Mergers between municipalities are voluntary.
7
 We analyze voting in municipal 
elections in mergers that took place between the 2004 and 2008 municipal elections. 
Between these two elections, there were 47 municipal mergers involving 130 
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 A typical merger process is as follows: After an initial feasibility study, municipal boards make a 
proposal of the merger to the municipal councils. This proposal is voted on by the councils. If the 
proposed merger gains a majority in all the participating councils, the merger goes through. If not, all the 
municipalities continue as they were. For more details, see Hyytinen, Saarimaa and Tukiainen (2013). 
6
 municipalities. The number of municipalities in a given merger ranged from 2 to 10 
municipalities. As a result, the number of municipalities diminished from 432 to 348. 
In this study, we are not focusing on the reasons behind this recent merger wave. 
In public discussion, it has been seen mainly as a result of increasing fiscal pressure due 
to differences in population trends and aging across municipalities, which makes small 
and poor municipalities unable to provide the large set of public services they are 
responsible for. This pressure is certainly real since small municipalities share the same 
responsibilities as the large ones. Moreover, new central government policies, such as 
large merger subsidies may have encouraged merging. Saarimaa and Tukiainen (2013) 
describe the determinants of these mergers at an aggregate level. They find evidence 
suggesting that fiscal pressure, voter preferences and local democracy considerations 
influence the eventual map, but less evidence of scale economies driving the mergers. 
Hyytinen, Saarimaa and Tukiainen (2013) study the merger decisions at individual 
candidate level and find that councilors’ re-election concerns play a role. 
Due to extensive tasks of the Finnish municipalities voters may benefit from 
having a local representative in the council for a number of reasons. The first reason is 
related to the common pool problem first formalized by Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen 
(1981). If there are identifiable (geographic) local groups within a municipality that 
benefit from spending in their area and if the spending is financed globally by all 
taxpayers in the municipality, having a local representative may be instrumental in 
receiving the benefits from local spending. Baron and Ferejohn (1987 and 1989) show 
that the common pool creates incentives, not only to increase own-district spending, but 
also to restrain the  spending in other districts.
8
 In the case of municipal mergers, the 
citizens of different pre-merger municipalities can be clearly seen as representing 
different local groups. 
Second, if households with similar preferences have a tendency to sort into same 
municipalities (or neighborhoods) as suggested by Tiebout (1956), a councilor living 
close to a voter is more likely to share the preferences of the voter in terms of the 
service-tax bundle provided by the municipality.
9
 By service-tax bundle we refer both to 
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 See also Knight (2008). 
9
 See e.g. Epple, Romer and Sieg (2001), and Bayer and McMillan (2012) on sorting according to 
neighborhood quality and observable household characteristics.  
7
 the overall size of the local public sector, but also how spending is divided across 
different services, such as elementary schools or primary health care.  
Finland is quite homogeneous with respect to measures concerning voter 
heterogeneity previously analyzed in the literature (e.g. Alesina, Baqir and Hoxby 
2004). In particular, due to historically low immigration levels, neighboring 
municipalities are observably almost identical in ethnical, religious or racial 
heterogeneity measures. Also income differences are quite small in Finland relative to 
many other countries. Nonetheless, there is variation in regional income levels, and also 
in age and occupation structure, for example. 
Third, if councilors and voters consume similar services and dislike travel costs, a 
councilor living close to a voter is more likely to share the voter’s preferences over the 
geographic location of public services (schools, primary health care centers etc.). 
Furthermore, since house values are tied to the prevalence and quality of (public) 
services in the neighborhood, house value becomes an incentive device that may align 
councilors’ and voters’ preferences. This can be easily seen when both the councilor and 
the voter are homeowners. In this case, both have a desire to promote policies that 
increase their house value.
10
 The closer the councilor lives to the voter, the more 
correlated their travel costs and house values are, and because of this, the more aligned 
are the incentives of the councilor with the voter’s preferences. Moreover, both parties 
do not have to be homeowners in order for this incentive mechanism to work. For 
example, a voter with school-aged children may be more likely to vote for a local 
homeowner councilor without children than a councilor with children that lives in 
another neighborhood. The logic is that the homeowner councilor has incentives to 
promote investments into the local school because it makes the neighborhood more 
attractive and raises neighborhood house prices.
11
 Therefore, even in the case where 
otherwise homogenous agents are scattered more or less randomly across space, the 
common pool aspect of post merger municipal spending should make candidates’ 
location an important aspect when voters choose who to vote for.  
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 See e.g. DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999). 
11
 For example, Hilber and Mayer (2008) find empirical evidence that even households without children 
promote investments into local schools because the investments raise their house values. See also Fischel 
(2001).  
8
 2.2   Election system, mergers and voting behavior  
 
Finland has a multi-party system and currently there are eight parties in the Finnish 
parliament and these parties also dominate municipal politics. In the 2004 municipal 
elections, the three largest parties (the Centre Party, the Social Democrats and the 
National Coalition) received roughly 68 percent of the votes with roughly similar 
shares.
12
  
The municipal elections in Finland use an open-list method. The crucial feature 
for our analysis is that each voter casts a single vote to a single individual candidate. 
Importantly, voters cannot vote for a party without specifying a candidate. The seats of 
a given district are allocated based on party vote shares to the candidates in accordance 
with competitive indices set by the d’Hondt method. Thus, voters determine the position 
of the candidates in the party list, whereas parties are allocated seats according to the 
sum of votes over the individual candidates. 
Each municipality has only one electoral district (i.e. constituency) and no 
geographic quotas are in place. This applies also to the merged municipalities. 
However, most municipalities have many polling districts, which simply define the 
location where people go to vote (e.g. local school). The election data is registered and 
publicly available at the polling district and candidate level (also votes given in advance 
are registered to the correct polling district). Since these polling districts do not change 
because of the mergers, we know the location of voters also after the mergers.  
What should we expect to see after a municipality merger if voters value local 
representation? Mergers can be seen as electoral boundary reforms that change 
mechanically the set of voters that are able to vote for given candidates, the set of 
candidates that compete over council seats and the number of council seats (relative to 
number of voters). The way a given merger changes the latter two components is driven 
by electoral rules governing council size and the maximum number of candidates that 
parties are allowed to nominate. In Finland, the municipal council size is an increasing 
step function of municipality’s population as can be seen from Table 1, whereas the 
maximum number of candidates per party or list size is 1.5 times the council size. The 
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 In the 2011 parliamentary election, the Finns Party became the third largest party in the parliament 
overtaking the Centre Party. 
9
 list size restriction is binding only in larger municipalities and larger parties. However, 
it often becomes binding due to a merger. 
 
Table 1. Council size and maximum list size.  
 
 
The mechanical change induced by a merger and electoral rules may in turn 
induce a behavioral response from parties, candidates and voters. From the point of 
view of voters and local representation, the most important changes are related to the 
probability of electing a local candidate or the expected number of elected local 
candidates and changes in the set of candidates to choose from.  
As an example, consider two municipalities that merge. One has a population of, 
say, 3,000 and the other 25,000. From Table 1 we see that before the merger, the 
council sizes of these municipalities are 21 and 43, respectively. After the merger, the 
council size will also be 43. As whole, a merger results in a reduction in the number of 
councilors and typically the number of candidates. However, from the point of view of 
voters the overall number of candidates may increase and typically does increase 
substantially in the case of small municipalities that merge with a larger partner. In our 
example, this means that the voters from the smaller municipality can now vote for 
candidates coming from the larger merger partner. This is exactly the type of setup one 
would like to have in order to test preferences, because we observe voters’ choices 
before and after they are presented with a new choice set. 
We can draw the following testable hypotheses concerning voters’ response 
depending on whether voters are sincere or strategic. Consider first the case of sincere 
voters who do not take into account the election probability of their candidate, but 
Municipality population Council size Maximum list size
Less or equal to 2,000 13, 15, or 17 25
2,001–4,000 21 31
4,001–8,000 27 40
8,001–15,000 35 52
15,001–30,000 43 64
30,001–60,000 51 76
60,001–120,000 59 88
120,001–250,000 67 100
250,001–400,000 75 112
Over 400,000 85 127
10
 simply vote for the most suitable candidate. If voters do not value local representation, 
but make their voting decisions based on other criteria, such as candidate quality or 
party affiliation, we should see no change in the vote distribution or that the vote 
distribution of a municipality is less concentrated in the post-merger elections than it 
was in the pre-merger elections. This is because it is likely that some voters will find a 
better match from the new and larger choice set. If, on the other hand, voters value local 
representation and if the number of local candidates diminishes after a merger, we 
should observe a more concentrated vote distribution, especially in smaller 
municipalities. That is, even when the number of choices increases for voters, the vote 
distribution should be more concentrated so that votes are concentrated to fewer local 
candidates.  
What about the case of strategic voters? Again, if local representation does not 
matter, we should not expect vote concentration.
13
 If voters value local representation 
and if they act strategically to secure local representation, we should observe vote 
concentration also within the group of local candidates. In this case, some voters would 
abandon their “sincere” local choice and vote for a candidate that has a legitimate 
chance of winning a seat from a non-local candidate. Again we should see this 
especially among smaller municipalities where the expected number of elected local 
representatives goes down more.  
To sum up, if local representation matters we should observe vote concentration 
after a merger, especially in smaller municipalities. If voters are strategic and value 
local representation, we should see vote concentration also within local candidates. Vote 
concentration may also depend on the different mechanisms described in the previous 
section. In the empirical part of the paper, we test these hypotheses by analyzing how 
municipalities vote distributions change due the mergers. 
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 What happens exactly depends on how pivotal probabilities change due a merger.   
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 3   Econometric analysis  
3.1 Data and outcomes of interest  
 
Our main data source is the election database maintained by the Ministry of Justice.
14
 
The data include information on votes received by individual candidates from two 
municipal elections held in October of 2004 and 2008. The 2008 municipal elections 
were held using the new merged municipalities as constituencies.
15
 We also have data 
from the 1996 and 2000 municipal elections, which will be used in pre-treatment trend 
analysis and in a placebo test. In addition to election data, we use municipal 
characteristic to study whether voters’ reactions are heterogeneous with respect to 
observable differences among merging municipalities. We also use municipal 
characteristics as control variables in some specifications. These data are produced by 
Statistics Finland. 
Since municipalities are divided into (time invariant) polling districts we can build 
a panel data set where the cross-sectional units are the municipalities in 2004, i.e. before 
the mergers.
16
 That is, we can trace back which candidates received votes from the pre-
merger municipalities also in the post-merger elections in 2008. Even though we do not 
know the location of the candidates, information on the location of the votes facilitates 
our empirical analysis.  
Our main interest lies on whether voters concentrate their votes to particular 
candidates. To this end, we use two outcomes to measure the concentration of votes that 
are defined as 
 
(1) 
 
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1
max , 1,...,  and 
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where si is the vote share of candidate i in a particular municipality and N is the total 
number of candidates in the municipality. The first measure (C) is simply the vote share 
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 Similar data are also freely available online at Statistics Finland’s website. 
15
 In many cases, the municipalities merged officially at the start of the calendar year 2009. However, also 
in these cases the new municipality division was used in the 2008 elections.  
16
 In some cases, the polling districts changed and we were unable to trace back the old municipal 
division. In these cases, we drop the entire merger from the analysis.  
12
 of the most popular candidate. The second measure we use is the Herfindahl index (H). 
The larger H is the more concentrated the vote distribution is. These measures are 
(roughly) invariant to other changes that occur because of the merger, such as changes 
in council size and number of candidates. This is important because concentration 
measures that are not invariant to the number of candidates would capture mechanical 
effects that are not due to changes in voter behavior.
17
  
 
3.2 Main results  
 
We start with a simple DID strategy with a control (no merger) and a treatment group 
(merger) with two time periods. The econometric model can be written as 
 
(2) 0 1 2 3 ,it i t i t ity merger after merger after           
 
where yit is the outcome in question for municipality i (2004 division) in year t, merger 
a dummy variable that equals one if the municipality underwent a merger between the 
two elections, after a dummy variable that equals one if the data come from post-merger 
elections and u is the error term. 
A simple merger dummy variable is of course a coarse measure of the treatment 
that voters in the municipalities receive as a result of a merger. If voters value local 
representation, we should observe voters from small municipalities in a given merger to 
concentrate their votes more than voters from larger municipalities simply because 
smaller municipalities have a lower chance of electing representatives to the post-
merger council.  
In order to test this, we need a measure that captures these differences. To this 
end, we used actual election rules (open-list D’Hondt) and calculated hypothetical 
election outcomes for each individual candidate using actual votes and candidates from 
the 2004 elections, but assumed that the mergers had taken place. From these election 
outcomes we can calculate the share of the 2004 pre-merger candidates that would make 
it into the new post-merger council with their 2004 votes. This share is measured at the 
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 For example, the Gini index would not be a very good measure in our case because it is sensitive to the 
number of candidates especially if a lot of the candidates receive very little or no votes. In fact, our results 
are even stronger if we use the Gini index as an outcome.   
13
 2004 pre-merger municipality level. Our treatment variable is 1 minus the share of 2004 
candidates that would make into the post-merger council with 2004 votes. This variable 
equals 0 if all candidates from a municipality would make it into the post-merger 
council (effectively no treatment) and it equals one if none of them would (maximum 
treatment). In other words, this variable measures the expected share of local 
representatives that a municipality would lose if all the voters and candidates would 
behave in the 2008 elections exactly as they did in the 2004 elections. Descriptive 
statistics of this measure are reported in Table A1 in Appendix A. On average a 
municipality loses almost 66 percent of their council seats if the post-merger elections 
were held with the exact same candidates and vote distributions. 
Due to the particular election system, this measure of treatment intensity mainly 
captures situations where the benefit of vote concentration is related to getting their 
local candidates past the non-local candidates in within party rankings. However, within 
party concentration does not increase local representation in the case that parties have 
very different support bases in different municipalities. As an example, consider a 
merger where all voters from a small municipality A support party L, and in a large 
municipality B, all support party R. In this case, within party vote concentration would 
not increase local representation, even though the smaller municipality gets a large 
treatment according to our measure. Instead, local representation would be determined 
solely by the between party allocation of seats. Fortunately, in our data, the three largest 
parties have significant support base in almost all the municipalities, thus making this 
concern irrelevant in practice (see Figure A1 in Appendix A). Moreover, candidates or 
voters may also change the party. In that case, our measure would be relevant even in 
our extreme example.  
In this part of the analysis, we confine ourselves to the subsample of merged 
municipalities and estimate the following model
18
 
 
(3) 0 1 2 3 ,it i t i t ity seatshare after seathare after u          
 
                                                 
18
 This specification produces exactly the same results as a model where we include the non-merged 
municipalities and included dummies and interactions for merging as in Eq. (2).   
14
 where seatshare is variable described above. The higher the value of seatshare is the 
more incentives voters should have for vote concentration. 
We start with graphical analysis.
19
 In Panel A of Figure 1, we show the trends in 
the maximum vote share and the Herfindahl index for the group of municipalities that 
merged between the 2004 and 2008 municipal elections and for those who did not. The 
dots in the Figure represent group specific means. In Panel B, we have divided the 
merger group into three equal-sized subgroups based on the (ordered) seatshare 
variable. The low incentives group refers to municipalities who expect to do relatively 
well in the next elections in terms of local representation (low values of seatshare) while 
the high incentive group expect to do poorly (high values of seatshare).  
Both of our outcomes clearly have a common trend (or no trend) in the pre-
treatment period (1996, 2000 and 2004 elections) when no mergers took place.
20
 
Furthermore, there is a huge jump in both variables in 2008 in the merger group 
compared to previous years as both means almost double in size. A similar picture 
arises within the merger group. The common pre-trends assumption seems to be valid 
also for this grouping. Interestingly, there is no change in vote concentration among the 
municipalities in the low incentive group while we see a dramatic concentration in the 
high incentive group. The change in the median incentives group is also substantial. 
This is our first piece of convincing evidence that the vote distributions change 
considerably when municipalities undergo a merger and that the change depends on the 
incentives that voters have for vote concentration.
21
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 In Appendix B, we illustrate these results using individual municipalities and candidates. 
20
 There were 6 mergers between 2000 and 2004. These municipalities are excluded from the common 
pre-trend analysis. The results are robust also to including them in the analysis. 
21
 We tested the common pre-trends assumption also by using two placebo treatments and the basic DID 
models based on Eq. (2). These models are estimated as if the mergers took place either between the 1996 
and 2000 elections or between the 2000 and 2004 elections. These results are reported in Table A2 in 
Appendix A. We find no effects from these placebo treatments, which is consistent with the pre-treatment 
common trends illustrated in Figure 1. In addition, we experimented with an alternative control group. 
Some municipalities that did not merge voted for a merger between the 2004 and 2008 elections, but 
these mergers did not gain the majority in all the participating municipalities and fell through. In Figure 
B2, we present the trends in the merger group and this alternative control group. The pre-treatment trends 
in both of our concentration measures look again very similar and there is no significant jump in the 
measures of the alternative control group. 
15
  
Figure 1. Trends in vote distributions in different municipality groups, 1996–2008. 
 
In Table 2, we repeat these exercises using regressions to show that what we learn from 
Figure 1 is also statistically significant. Columns [1] and [2] present the results from the 
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 specification in Eq. (2), whereas columns [3] and [4] present the results from the 
specification in Eq. (3). All the results are large and statistically highly significant.  
From colums [3] and [4], we can see that the constant treatment effect (coefficient 
for after, because we look only at mergers) is actually negative for those municipalities 
who do not expect to lose any seats (seatshare equal to zero) and we observe about 9.6 
percentage points increase (12.1–2.5) in the maximum vote share for those who expect 
to have no local representatives in the post merger council (seatshare equal to one).
22
 
Appendix B offers more detailed party and candidate level analysis concerning vote 
concentration. 
 
Table 2. Results for vote concentration. 
 
 
3.3 Treatment effect heterogeneity  
 
We also analyze heterogeneity in the treatment effect of the variable seatshare. That is, 
we are not interested in the direct effect of various heterogeneity measures on vote 
concentration, but assume that heterogeneity only plays a role when there is a need for 
                                                 
22
 We estimated all the models where we added the following municipality characteristics as control 
variables: debt, expenditures, tax rate, taxable income and corporate tax revenues. These models can be 
estimated only for the mergers that took effect at the start of 2009. For earlier mergers we do not have 
data on municipality characteristics for 2008. Adding municipality controls does not change our results.  
Maximum 
vote share
Herfindahl 
index 
Maximum 
vote share
Herfindahl 
index 
[1] [2] [3] [4]
constant 0.0610*** 0.0249*** constant 0.0418*** 0.0110***
[0.0013] [0.0006]   [0.0030] [0.0014]   
merger 0.0016 0.0028*  seat share 0.0321*** 0.0257***
[0.0026] [0.0016]   [0.0049] [0.0029]   
after 0.0042*** 0.0010*** after -0.0252*** -0.0158***
[0.0013] [0.0003]   [0.0073] [0.0051]   
merger*after 0.0496*** 0.0223*** seat share* 0.1214*** 0.0601***
[0.0084] [0.0060]   after [0.0200] [0.0158]   
R
2
0.15 0.08 0.36 0.21
N 814 814 240 240
Notes:  The results are from OLS models. Clustered standard errors are reported in brackets. 
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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 vote concentration in order to increase local representation.
23
 Again, we conduct this 
analysis only within the subsample of merged municipalities. The models where we 
allow for heterogeneous treatment effects can be written as 
 
(4) 
0 1 2
3 4 5 ,
it i i i
t i t i i t it
y seatshare seatshare heterogeneity
after seatshare after seatshare heterogeneity after v
    
     
  
  
 
 
where the heterogeneity measure varies according specification.  
We measure preference heterogeneity using five variables. Our first measure of 
heterogeneity is related to voters’ geographic location. It is plausible to assume that 
after a merger there is pressure to concentrate at least some services to the business 
center of the largest municipality of a merger. Thus, based on the discussion in Section 
2, the farther away the voters are from the center of the largest municipality in the 
merger the stronger incentives they should have to concentrate votes and increase local 
representation. To measure these incentives, we calculated for each merged 
municipality the median Euclidian distance of all eligible voters to the centers of their 
own pre-merger municipality and the largest municipality in their merger.
24
 We use the 
difference in these median distances as our distance measure.  
In addition to preferences over the location of services, the level, type and quality 
of services may matter. If households have sorted into municipalities in the spirit of 
Tiebout, i.e. according to preferences over local public goods, it should be reflected as 
heterogeneity in the treatment effect of the variable seatshare. The more between 
municipality heterogeneity there is the more valuable is local representation. Therefore 
we analyze whether vote concentration depends on between municipality differences in 
variables that serve as proxies for preference heterogeneity. Our first measure is simply 
an indicator whether a merged municipality and the largest municipality in the same 
merger had the same largest party in the 2004 elected councils. If voters care for party 
                                                 
23
 The results do not change if we control also for the baseline heterogeneity and change in heterogeneity. 
24
 This calculation is based the GIS Grid Database (250 m * 250 m grids) produced by Statistics Finland. 
In addition to latitude and longitude coordinates, the data include information on the number of eligible 
voters (i.e. Finnish population above the age of 18) in each grid for the whole of Finland. This 
information together with coordinates of municipal centers enables us to calculate the median distance for 
eligible voters to the municipality centers. 
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 representation rather than local representation, similar party preferences should decrease 
the need for vote concentration. 
We also use two policy variables, namely the difference in pre-merger tax rates 
and per capita municipal expenditures. Expenditures could reflect differences in service 
requirements due to different age structure for example. Our final proxy is the 
difference in the municipal level mean of taxable income. The last three heterogeneity 
measures are calculated as follows. For municipality i in merger m we define 
 
(5) 
,
,
_
_ ,
_
im im m
im im m
mim im
het tax t t
het exp exp exp
het inc inc inc
 
 
 
 
 
where ,  m mt exp  and minc  refer to the population weighted mean municipal income tax 
rate, per capita expenditures and taxable income in merger m, respectively. Thus, these 
heterogeneity variables measure the difference between the pre-merger municipality and 
the consequent merger. Because the mean is weighted with population the difference is 
going to be the smaller the larger municipality i is relative to other municipalities in the 
merger for given values of heterogeneity measures. This is a natural measure because 
larger municipalities are more likely to be well represented in the post-merger councils, 
and thus, voters in larger municipalities should be less sensitive to these differences.
25
 
In other words, we assume that a given difference in, say, tax rates is going to matter 
more for voters from a smaller municipality. All of these measures are calculated using 
2006 values. Table A1 in Appendix A reports descriptive statistics of our heterogeneity 
measures.  
Table 3 presents the treatment effect heterogeneity results based on Eq. (4). 
Columns [1] to [10] report results from separate regressions. We draw three insights 
from Table 3. First, vote concentration increases as the median change in distance to 
municipality centre of eligible voters’ increases. This effect is also very large: an 
additional 10 km in distance increases the maximum vote share by roughly 5 percentage 
                                                 
25
 We experimented with different weighting schemes and different ways to measure heterogeneity. The 
results are largely the same. 
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 points. In other words, each additional 10 km roughly doubles the maximum vote share 
from its baseline.  
Second, concentration increases with income differences and the effect is 
quantitatively large. At a given level of seatshare, a one standard deviation (1085 
Euros) increase in the income difference increases the maximum vote share by 3.5 
percentage points, again a substantial increase from the baseline. The same patterns 
emerge if the Herfindahl index is used as the outcome, instead of the maximum vote 
share (see panel B in the Table 4). The fact that the treatment effect increases with 
income differences is not surprising, because under a flat local income tax high income 
citizens contribute more to the financing of public services. Finally, we find no 
heterogeneity in the treatment effect with respect to our direct policy measures (party, 
tax rate and per capita expenditures).  
Since none of our heterogeneity measures are randomized, the results may suffer 
from omitted variable bias. Thus, we cannot interpret their possible effect on the level of 
the treatment effect as causal. We simply can infer that the treatment effect varies in 
different merger situations. However, the likely candidates for omitted variables are also 
related to voter heterogeneity measures. Therefore, the results can be safely interpreted 
as evidence of some type of preference heterogeneity among voters of different 
municipalities. 
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 Table 3. Results for heterogeneous treatment effects. 
 
 
 
 
 
Heterogeneity measure: Distance Party Tax rate Expenditure Income
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
constant 0.0453*** 0.0402*** 0.0416*** 0.0420*** 0.0425***
[0.0032]   [0.0030]   [0.0030]   [0.0030]   [0.0031]   
seat share 0.0152** 0.0400*** 0.0336*** 0.0307*** 0.0288***
[0.0074]   [0.0061]   [0.0068]   [0.0064]   [0.0073]   
seat share * heterogeneity 0.0007*** -0.0133** -0.0036 0.0026 0.0015
[0.0003]   [0.0060]   [0.0111]   [0.0089]   [0.0026]   
after -0.0016 -0.0272*** -0.0219*** -0.0224*** -0.0106*  
[0.0074]   [0.0090]   [0.0062]   [0.0057]   [0.0059]   
seat share * after 0.0084 0.1315*** 0.0919*** 0.1044*** 0.0527***
[0.0363]   [0.0304]   [0.0166]   [0.0165]   [0.0191]   
seat share * heterogeneity * 0.0048** -0.0169 0.0704 0.0318 0.0322***
after [0.0020]   [0.0261]   [0.0502]   [0.0426]   [0.0078]   
R
2
0.54 0.37 0.38 0.37 0.43
N 240 240 240 240 240
[6] [7] [8] [9] [10]
constant 0.0139*** 0.0103*** 0.0112*** 0.0117*** 0.0119***
[0.0015]   [0.0014]   [0.0013]   [0.0014]   [0.0014]   
seat share 0.0115*** 0.0289*** 0.0235*** 0.0208*** 0.0213***
[0.0042]   [0.0035]   [0.0037]   [0.0038]   [0.0041]   
seat share * heterogeneity 0.0006*** -0.0054 0.0053 0.0091 0.0021
[0.0001]   [0.0039]   [0.0084]   [0.0065]   [0.0017]   
after 0.0028 -0.0185*** -0.0136*** -0.0132*** -0.0074** 
[0.0059]   [0.0071]   [0.0038]   [0.0032]   [0.0036]   
seat share * after -0.0291 0.0733*** 0.0403*** 0.0440*** 0.0206*  
[0.0322]   [0.0259]   [0.0098]   [0.0093]   [0.0116]   
seat share * heterogeneity * 0.0038** -0.0222 0.0472 0.0301 0.0185***
after [0.0018]   [0.0202]   [0.0398]   [0.0333]   [0.0052]   
R
2
0.44 0.23 0.24 0.23 0.26
N 240 240 240 240 240
Panel A: Maximum vote share
Panel B: Herfindahl index
Notes:  The results are from OLS models. Clustered standard errors are reported in brackets. 
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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 4   Discussion and validity checks  
4.1 Local representation  
 
There are several competing explanations for our findings concerning both local 
representation and strategic voting. In order to fix ideas, consider first what type of an 
experiment would identify both preferences for local representation and strategic voting 
and how our natural experiment relates to this benchmark. First, for an experiment to 
teach us something about voter preferences over candidates, it needs to induce 
exogenous variation to the set of available candidates. If we observe a voter choosing a 
local candidate over a non-local candidate when both are available, we can interpret this 
choice as revealing a preference for local over non-local candidate. Second, to infer 
whether voters are strategic from the experiment, it needs to induce exogenous variation 
on whether a voter’s vote is pivotal. If a voter’s preferred local candidate is highly 
unlikely to get elected, a strategic voter would instead vote for another local candidate 
with a legitimate chance of winning a seat from the non-local candidates. Moreover, the 
experiment should not influence the set of voters or their preference ranking over 
candidates, or the set of candidates or their behavior. While our natural experiment 
induces variation both to the voter’s choice set and to the political competition, it may at 
the same time also influence these confounders. In this section, we discuss these issues 
and provide additional econometric evidence that supports our interpretation.  
We start with our claim that the results are due to preferences for local 
representation and provide more information on the way the voters’ choice set changed 
due to the mergers and how these changes are related to the intensity of treatment that 
voters receive (seatshare). From Table 4, we notice that a merger expands the voters’ 
choice set both in terms of available candidates and parties. The number of candidates a 
voter can choose from increases on average by 155, an increase of about 160 percent 
(see Column [1]). A merger also increases the number of available party lists on average 
by 2, an increase of about 40 percent (see Column [2]). Both of these effects are 
stronger for higher values of seatshare (see Columns [6] and [7]). In light of these 
numbers, if voters do not value local representation, we should probably observe less 
concentrated vote distributions after the mergers because voters are likely to find better 
matches from the larger number of alternatives. A more concentrated vote distribution 
22
 after the voters are presented with a larger choice set implies strong preferences for 
local representation.  
 
Table 4. Additional results.  
 
 
A possible issue with our analysis is the nature of our data and the fact that we do 
not observe the residential location of all candidates, and thus do not know whether the 
votes are really concentrated to local candidates. An alternative explanation for our 
findings could be, for example, that due to a merger some prominent national politicians 
or other “superstars” become available to all voters of the merging municipalities. This 
could happen especially when a small municipality mergers with a larger city.  
Number of 
candidates Number of parties
Polling district 
Herfindahl index
Number of total 
votes
[1] [2] [3] [4]
constant 95.08*** 5.794*** 0.518*** 5898***
[5.357] [0.117] [0.018] [1080]
merger 0.495 -0.386* 0.062* -1016
[9.235] [0.225] [0.037] [1273]
after 2.314*** 0.425*** 0.032*** 386.7***
[0.854] [0.069] [0.011] [89.10]
merger*after 154.9*** 2.125*** 0.006 32.32
[11.999] [0.179] [0.018] [140.3]
R
2
0.23 0.14 0.01 0.001
N 814 814 814 814
[5] [6] [7] [8]
constant 197.8*** 7.647*** 0.162*** 13036***
[18.76] [0.329] [0.049] [2012]
seat share -157.3*** -3.443*** 0.643*** -12542***
[21.67] [0.447] [0.063] [2319.392]
after 3.708 0.32 0.053** 1446***
[10.34] [0.195] [0.025] [330.3]
seat share* 236.1*** 3.431*** -0.023 -1580***
after [21.60] [0.315] [0.037] [380.9]
R
2
0.42 0.47 0.40 0.35
N 240 240 240 240
Notes:  The results are from OLS models.Clustered standard errors are reported in brackets. 
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
Panel A: Difference-in-differences
Panel B: Continuous treatment
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 We offer two pieces of evidence to alleviate these concerns.  First, out of the 120 
candidates that received the maximum vote share, 97 were candidates that we can safely 
assume to be local. These are candidates that ran for a council seat in both the 2004 and 
2008 elections and in 2004, ran in the given pre-merger municipality of interest. As 
long as these candidates did not move between the election years (within a merger), 
they can be regarded as local. Furthermore, only one out of the 120 stars lived in some 
other municipality of a given merger in the 2004 elections. 22 out 120 were newcomers 
for whom we do not know in which municipality they reside in.  
In addition, we can analyze more closely from where the candidates receive their 
votes. We do this by calculating a Herfindhal index using polling district level vote 
shares for the most popular candidate in each pre-merger municipality. After the 
merger, these candidates may receive votes from all the polling districts in the merger, 
not only from their own pre-merger municipality’s polling districts. If they receive votes 
from the new polling districts, we should observe a decrease in the Herfindahl index. 
From columns [3] and [8] in Table 4, we see that a merger has no effect on the index, 
which suggests that the most popular candidates receive their votes from the same 
polling districts as before, that is from their pre-merger municipalities. 
The fact that the size of the constituency increases due to a merger, in some cases 
substantially, may directly influence voters’ willingness to vote for various reasons (see 
e.g. Dahl and Tufte 1973). Since both of our concentration measures are based on 
candidate vote shares, we need to be sure that changes in the total number of votes are 
not driving the results. The post-merger vote distributions may be more concentrated, 
even in the case where the most popular local candidates receive fewer votes. This 
happens if voters who voted for the less popular candidates in the pre-merger election 
abstain in the post merger elections. From Column 8, we can see that this is a real 
concern since the number of votes clearly decreases in the relatively smaller 
municipalities, even though it does not decrease in mergers on average (see Column 
[4]).
26
 In order to test that changes in the total number of votes do not influence our 
findings, we estimated all of the vote concentration regressions using the 2004 number 
                                                 
26
 This result is in line with the findings by Lassen and Serritzlew (2011) who find that after the Danish 
municipal merger reform, voters in merged municipalities felt less competent to take part in municipal 
politics. However, Lassen and Serritzlew (2011) do not directly analyze voting behavior. 
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 of total votes when calculating candidates’ vote shares. Reassuringly, the results remain 
the same (not reported here for brevity).  
Finally, voters may keep on voting for local candidates for reasons other than 
local representation. In particular, we could observe vote concentration simply because 
voters have better information about the quality of local candidates, and thus, continue 
to vote for local candidates after the merger. In this case, if the number of local 
candidates decreases, the vote distribution is going to be more concentrated than before 
the merger. In Table 5, we present evidence against this interpretation. Columns [1] and 
[4] report the effects on the number of votes for local candidates who ran in both 
elections as explained above. On average these candidates do not increase their votes 
after a merger, but they do get more votes after the merger in relatively small 
municipalities. More importantly, from columns [2], [3], [5] and [6] we see that votes 
are concentrated also within the set of local candidates. Information advantage cannot 
drive vote concentration among local candidates because all of these candidates should 
benefit equally from the local information advantage.  
 
Table 5. Vote concentration among local candidates. 
 
 
 
 
Number of 
votes
Maximum 
vote share
Herfindahl 
index 
Number of 
votes
Maximum 
vote share
Herfindahl 
index 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
constant 3769.6*** 0.0935*** 0.0441*** constant 8837.3*** 0.0355*** -0.0017
[672.02] [0.0021] [0.0012]   [1421.0] [0.0080] [0.0064]   
merger -704.45 0.0396*** 0.0346*** seat share -8878.1*** 0.1500*** 0.1236***
[819.55] [0.0094] [0.0081]   [1644.4] [0.0209] [0.0190]   
after 91.585 0.0056*** 0.0025*** after -218.18 -0.0048 -0.0087***
[69.032] [0.0016] [0.0004]   [148.50] [0.0060] [0.0032]   
merger*after -47.144 0.0436*** 0.0234*** seat share* 403.93** 0.0830*** 0.0533***
[82.141] [0.0060] [0.0038]   after [176.01] [0.0128] [0.0092]   
R
2
0.001 0.15 0.13 0.37 0.35 0.28
N 814 814 814 240 240 240
Notes:  The results are from OLS models. Clustered standard errors are reported in brackets. ***, ** and * 
indicate statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
25
 4.2 Strategic voting 
 
The second claim we make is that, in addition to valuing local representation, voters are 
strategic in their efforts to guarantee it. If voters are strategic they should care about the 
election probabilities of the candidates and vote so that their vote has a chance of 
affecting the election outcome. The crucial piece of evidence in favor of this 
interpretation is presented in Table 5. The fact that local candidates receive more votes 
is what one would expect if voters value local representation. When voters’ old 
candidates no longer run, they vote for other local candidates to guarantee local 
representation and this could be a purely sincere choice. However, votes are 
concentrated also within the set of local candidates. This indicates that the voters, whose 
former preferred candidate no longer runs, vote popular local candidates 
disproportionally relative to the candidates’ popularity in the pre-merger elections. If 
voters were totally sincere, we would expect their votes to be uniformly (or 
proportionally) distributed to the available local candidates which would translate into a 
negative (or zero) effect in our vote concentration regressions using local candidates. 
Alternatively, some voters abandon their former candidate in order to vote for 
candidates with a legitimate chance of election. Either way, this is evidence is consistent 
with strategic voting due to voters’ preferences for local representation.27  
There are two alternative explanations for the results in Table 5. First alternative 
is campaigning effort by candidates (or parties). The logic of this concern is the 
following. Candidates who have a genuine chance of getting elected may exert more 
campaigning effort than other candidates. If these candidates exert more effort in a 
disproportionate way relative to their popularity in the pre-merger elections and if voters 
are very responsive to campaigning, this could explain our concentration results.
28
 
However, we can reproduce the heterogeneous treatment effect results also for the 
subsample of local candidates (Table A3 in Appendix A). The finding that the 
concentration among local candidates increases with income differences and especially 
with distance is not consistent with campaigning effort, whereas it is consistent with 
                                                 
27
 We also estimated these models also using the 2004 total number of votes when calculating vote shares 
and the results remain the same. 
28
 If campaigning is mostly related to conferring information on election probabilities, this does not pose a 
problem to our interpretation. If that is the case, campaigning can be seen as a coordination device. 
26
 voter preferences for local representation. Candidates who care only for political power 
should not respond to heterogeneity measures unless also the benefits of holding office 
are correlated with the heterogeneity measures. Moreover, previous empirical evidence 
suggests that it is quite difficult to influence voter behavior with campaigning (Levitt 
1994, Ansolabehere et al. 2003, Gerber et al. 2003 and Krasno and Green 2008). 
The second alternative explanation is that a merger may change the voters’ 
(sincerely) preferred candidate. This might happen because different political skills may 
be valuable in larger post-merger municipalities than in the smaller pre-merger 
municipalities. If these skills are rare among local candidates, vote concentration could 
be a result of purely sincere choices. It is important to note that these arguments are 
completely in line with voters voting for local candidates. Thus, this possibility casts 
some doubts on whether we can attribute our results to strategic voting, but it does not 
refute the result that voters value local representation. 
Finally, we can also evaluate how successful voters were in securing local 
representation using the seatshare variable and actual 2008 election results. In our data, 
20 out of the 120 merged municipalities would not have gained any representation into 
the post-merger council in our counterfactual elections (seatshare equal to 1). In reality, 
these municipalities gained on average over two representatives (maximum being 6) and 
only one of these municipalities failed to gain a single one. This calculation is based on 
the subsample of data including only local candidates. Since the calculation excludes 
any new local candidates, this is a lower bound for the gained local representation. 
From this analysis, we can conclude that voters were quite successful in their efforts. 
 
5   Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we use voting data and DID methods to analyze how voters in local 
municipal elections reacted to a recent wave of municipality mergers in Finland. A 
municipal merger can be seen as an electoral boundary reform that expands the choice 
set available to voters and at the same time intensifies political competition. We find 
that voters in municipalities that underwent a merger concentrate their votes to strong 
local candidates compared to voters in municipalities that did not merge. Moreover, the 
concentration effect is clearly stronger in municipalities that were less likely to gain 
27
 local representation in the post-merger councils based on counterfactual election 
calculations. This happened despite the fact that the voters in the merged municipalities 
had much larger set of candidates and parties to choose from after a merger. We 
interpret these results so that voters value local representation and vote strategically (as 
opposed to sincerely) in order guarantee it, although the latter interpretation remains 
somewhat uncertain due to potential confounders. 
In addition, we analyze whether the observed vote concentration patterns are 
consistent with voters’ preferences in terms of local service-tax bundles and location of 
local services. Indeed, we find that vote concentration increases both as the 
geographical distance and income heterogeneity between merging municipalities 
increases. The first result suggests that voters care about the geographic location of 
public services and the second that there is between municipality preference 
heterogeneity over services. 
Besides providing evidence on both the importance of preferences for local 
representation and strategic voting, the results have implications for merger policy. The 
upside of larger municipalities is that they internalize inter-jurisdictional spillovers and 
facilitate exploitation of scale economies, but the downside is that they lead to an 
increasing mismatch of preferences and public services if there are spatial differences in 
voter preferences (Alesina and Spolaore 1997). A number of papers have shown that 
this type of heterogeneity is important (Brasington 2003, Alesina Baqir and Hoxby 
2004, Gordon and Knight 2009 and Saarimaa and Tukiainen 2013). Our results 
contribute to this literature by shedding further light on the type of preference 
heterogeneity among voters that is relevant for merger policy and by showing that 
voters perceive local representation to be important in transferring these preferences 
into policy outcomes. An interesting future avenue for research would be to analyze 
whether local representation has an effect on the subsequent policy decisions in the 
merged municipalities. 
While our placebo, subsample and heterogeneity analyses and simply the sheer 
size of the effects give us confidence that the result is causal and internally valid (the 
result applies to the municipalities that actually merged), external validity of the result 
is an open issue. On the one hand, the mergers involve a significant share of Finnish 
municipalities, the effects are large and the comparison involves very heterogeneous set 
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 of mergers. Therefore, one could argue that it is safe to generalize the results to Finland. 
On the other hand, merging is a major decision on part of the municipalities and it could 
be, for example, that merged municipalities are more homogenous in terms of voter 
preferences than municipalities that choose not to merge. Furthermore, we cannot 
generalize the results to other countries, if they have very different political institutions 
or municipalities are responsible for different tasks. As usual, replication of our analysis 
in other countries with merger activity and similar data would be useful.  
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 Appendix A. Additional figures and regression results. 
 
Table A1. Descriptive statistics.  
 
 
Table A2. Placebo tests using 1996, 2000 and 2004 election data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Share of council seats lost using old votes 0.650 0.353 0 1
Distance (km)
a
11.47 12.40 -1.711 50.03
Different largest party
b
0.292 0.456 0.000 1.000
Difference in tax rate 0.285 0.283 0.000 1.479
Difference in expenditures (€ per capita) 0.313 0.346 0.001 1.695
Difference in taxable income (€ per capita) 1.087 1.085 0.007 5.259
a
 Median distance of an eligible voter to the centre of the largest municipality in the merger. Equals 
zero for the largest municipality.
b
 Dummy that equals 1 if a municipality had a different largest party than the largest municipality in 
a merger and zero otherwise.
Maximum vote 
share
Herfindahl 
index 
Maximum vote 
share
Herfindahl 
index 
[1] [2] [3] [4]
constant 0.0593*** 0.0228*** 0.0596*** 0.0244***
[0.0013] [0.0005]   [0.0012] [0.0006]   
merger 0.0021 0.0027** 0.0015 0.0024*  
[0.0025] [0.0013]   [0.0024] [0.0014]   
after 0.0003 0.0015*** 0.0014 0.0005
[0.0013] [0.0003]   [0.0013] [0.0003]   
merger*after -0.0006 -0.0003 0.0003 0.0004
[0.0021] [0.0005]   [0.0020] [0.0006]   
R
2
837 837 825 825
N 0.001 0.016 0.002 0.011
Notes:  The results are from OLS models. Clustered standard errors are reported in 
brackets. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, 
respectively. 
1996 to 2000: 2000 to 2004:
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 Table A3. Results for heterogeneous effects using local candidates. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Heterogeneity measure: Distance Party Tax rate Expenditure Income
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
constant 0.0619*** 0.0314*** 0.0386*** 0.0391*** 0.0477***
[0.0077]   [0.0089]   [0.0070]   [0.0074]   [0.0069]   
seat share 0.0233 0.1700*** 0.1224*** 0.1277*** 0.0923***
[0.0294]   [0.0276]   [0.0194]   [0.0238]   [0.0234]   
seat share * heterogeneity 0.0053*** -0.0336 0.0656 0.0417 0.0270** 
[0.0014]   [0.0278]   [0.0562]   [0.0437]   [0.0134]   
after 0.0059 -0.0019 -0.0026 -0.0032 0.0053
[0.0059]   [0.0063]   [0.0060]   [0.0061]   [0.0064]   
seat share * after 0.0316*  0.0691*** 0.0633*** 0.0733*** 0.0354*  
[0.0190]   [0.0175]   [0.0163]   [0.0172]   [0.0197]   
seat share * heterogeneity * 0.0022** 0.0233 0.0468*  0.0181 0.0223***
after [0.0009]   [0.0170]   [0.0244]   [0.0256]   [0.0063]   
R
2
0.54 0.35 0.37 0.36 0.42
N 240 240 240 240 240
[6] [7] [8] [9] [10]
constant 0.0224*** -0.0041 0.0017 0.0027 0.0091*  
[0.0060]   [0.0075]   [0.0051]   [0.0058]   [0.0051]   
seat share 0.0079 0.1357*** 0.0927*** 0.0968*** 0.0728***
[0.0276]   [0.0260]   [0.0163]   [0.0217]   [0.0209]   
seat share * heterogeneity 0.0049*** -0.0202 0.0735 0.0501 0.0238*  
[0.0014]   [0.0254]   [0.0523]   [0.0405]   [0.0124]   
after 0.0014 -0.0086** -0.0080** -0.0075*** -0.0021
[0.0032]   [0.0040]   [0.0031]   [0.0028]   [0.0028]   
seat share * after 0.0049 0.0529*** 0.0465*** 0.0455*** 0.0220** 
[0.0160]   [0.0144]   [0.0107]   [0.0092]   [0.0100]   
seat share * heterogeneity * 0.0020** 0.0006 0.0163 0.0145 0.0147***
after [0.0009]   [0.0120]   [0.0198]   [0.0174]   [0.0040]   
R
2
0.51 0.28 0.31 0.30 0.34
N 240 240 240 240 240
Panel A: Maximum vote share
Panel B: Herfindahl index
Notes:  The results are from OLS models. Clustered standard errors are reported in brackets. 
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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Figure A1. Party vote shares in 2004. 
 
 
Figure A2. Trends in vote distributions using the alternative control group, 1996–2008. 
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 Appendix B. Additional party and candidate level analysis 
 
In this appendix, we present more detailed analysis of vote concentration within parties 
and also examples using individual municipalities and candidates. We start by 
examining more closely the concentration patterns within parties. In Table B1, in each 
cell, we report the main coefficient of interest (seatshare*after) from regression models 
based on Eq. (3). In these regressions the cross-sectional unit is municipality party and 
the response variables measure the vote shares of the 1
st
 to the 5
th
 most successful 
candidate within a party, not municipality. 
The results are quite interesting. Vote concentration takes place only within four 
parties: The three largest parties and the Swedish People’s Party. While the latter is a 
small party at a national level, it is typically a very large party in those municipalities 
that it is present at all (see Figure A1 in Appendix A). Moreover, for the Social 
Democrats and the National Coalition Party, votes are concentrated only to the most 
popular candidate, while already the third most popular candidate is losing market 
share. For these parties, voters seem to abandon their old favorites to support the most 
popular candidate. For the small parties, who are often unlikely to benefit from vote 
concentration, we do not observe a change in voter behavior. For the Centre Party, votes 
are concentrated to the four best candidates. Centre Party is large especially in small 
rural municipalities, and thus, stands to lose most seats due to the mergers. In the 
context of strategic voting, it is more effective to concentrate votes to more than one 
candidate if there are enough voters to get many local candidates past the post. 
Alternatively, coordination may be more difficult if there are many local candidates to 
choose from.  
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 Table B1. Vote concentration within municipality-parties. 
 
 
Next we look at concentration patterns for individual candidates within a single 
merger. As an example, we analyze at the merger between a small municipality of 
Savonranta and the much larger city of Savonlinna. The populations of these 
municipalities in 2004 are 1,238 and 27,463, respectively. The pre-merger council size 
was 15 in Savonranta and 43 in Savonlinna, whereas the post-merger council size is 43. 
Figure B1 shows histograms for the vote distribution in Savonranta and 
Savonlinna before (in 2004) and after the merger (in 2008). The graphs report votes 
coming from the pre-merger municipalities. The first thing to note from Figure B1 is 
Centre Party
Social 
Democrats
National 
Coalition Party Left Alliance
[1] [2] [3] [4]
1st 0.2838*** 0.1445*** 0.1778*** 0.0357
[0.0353] [0.0448] [0.0455] [0.0657]
2nd 0.0641*** 0.013 0.0205 -0.0590**
[0.0150] [0.0162] [0.0183] [0.0233]
3rd 0.0333*** -0.0335*** -0.0143 -0.0590***
[0.0116] [0.0113] [0.0108] [0.0162]
4th 0.0197** -0.0313*** -0.0365*** -0.0181
[0.0079] [0.0089] [0.0086] [0.0136]
5th 0.0036 -0.0371*** -0.0327*** -0.009
[0.0061] [0.0063] [0.0068] [0.0108]
Greens of 
Finland
Christian 
Democrats
Swedish 
People´s Party Finns Party
[5] [6] [7] [8]
1st -0.0261 0.028 0.5062** 0.1756
[0.1258] [0.1154] [0.1916] [0.1614]
2nd -0.0710** -0.0452 0.1323** -0.025
[0.0349] [0.0287] [0.0549] [0.0417]
3rd -0.0744*** -0.0342 0.0573 -0.002
[0.0256] [0.0234] [0.0398] [0.0350]
4th -0.0141 -0.0419*** 0.0226 -0.0343*
[0.0184] [0.0124] [0.0267] [0.0194]
5th -0.0158 -0.0232** -0.0405 -0.0594***
[0.0144] [0.0105] [0.0251] [0.0113]   
Notes:  The results are from OLS models where the dependent variables are the vote 
shares of the most, the 2nd most, the 3rd most the 4th most and the 5th most popular 
candidate in a given party. Each cell in the table represents a coefficient from a separate 
regression model. Clustered standard errors are reported in brackets. ***, ** and * 
indicate statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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 that the most popular candidate in Savonranta received 80 votes making her/him the 
only candidate that would make it into the new post-merger council if a merger took 
place and voters behaved exactly as they did in the pre-merger elections.  
The distributions of votes in both municipalities look roughly similar in terms of 
dispersion before the merger. Moreover, the distributions of votes in Savonlinna before 
and after are very similar. However, in Savonranta, the vote distribution changes 
dramatically after the merger. Before the merger, votes were spread out quite evenly, 
whereas after the merger two clear “superstars” gather a lot of votes and also the 
number of candidates receiving only one vote increases dramatically. Importantly, these 
two candidates also made it into the new council, instead of just one that would have 
been the case with the old vote distribution. Moreover, the overall number of votes in 
these two municipalities did not change substantially between the two elections. The 
total number of candidates to choose from is larger in 2008 than in 2004 for both 
municipalities, even though the number of local candidates is smaller. 
 
 
Figure B1. Vote distributions in Savonranta and Savonlinna in 2004 and 2008. 
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 Figure B2 illustrates another example where two roughly equal sized 
municipalities, Toijala and Viiala, merged. The population of Toijala was 5,372 and 
8,299 for Viiala. As can be seen from Figure B2, there is some evidence of vote 
concentration in both these municipalities, slightly more so in Toijala (again note the 
change in the scale of the axis of Viiala), but clearly less so than in Savonranta in Figure 
B1.   
 
 
Figure B2. Vote distributions in Viiala and Toijala in 2004 and 2008. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
.0
2
.0
4
.0
6
.0
8
.1
D
e
n
s
it
y
0 50 100 150
Votes 2004 Viiala
0
.0
2
.0
4
.0
6
.0
8
.1
D
e
n
s
it
y
0 50 100 150
Votes 2008 Viiala
0
.0
2
.0
4
.0
6
D
e
n
s
it
y
0 50 100 150 200
Votes 2004 Toijala
0
.0
2
.0
4
.0
6
D
e
n
s
it
y
0 50 100 150 200
Votes 2008 Toijala
38
  
 
Documents de Treball de l’IEB 
 
2011 
 
2011/1, Oppedisano, V; Turati, G.: "What are the causes of educational inequalities and of their evolution over time 
in Europe? Evidence from PISA" 
2011/2, Dahlberg, M; Edmark, K; Lundqvist, H.: "Ethnic diversity and preferences for redistribution " 
2011/3, Canova, L.; Vaglio, A.: "Why do educated mothers matter? A model of parental help” 
2011/4, Delgado, F.J.; Lago-Peñas, S.; Mayor, M.: “On the determinants of local tax rates: new evidence from 
Spain” 
2011/5, Piolatto, A.; Schuett, F.: “A model of music piracy with popularity-dependent copying costs” 
2011/6, Duch, N.; García-Estévez, J.; Parellada, M.: “Universities and regional economic growth in Spanish 
regions” 
2011/7, Duch, N.; García-Estévez, J.: “Do universities affect firms’ location decisions? Evidence from Spain” 
2011/8, Dahlberg, M.; Mörk, E.: “Is there an election cycle in public employment? Separating time effects from 
election year effects” 
2011/9, Costas-Pérez, E.; Solé-Ollé, A.; Sorribas-Navarro, P.: “Corruption scandals, press reporting, and 
accountability. Evidence from Spanish mayors” 
2011/10, Choi, A.; Calero, J.; Escardíbul, J.O.: “Hell to touch the sky? private tutoring and academic achievement 
in Korea” 
2011/11, Mira Godinho, M.; Cartaxo, R.: “University patenting, licensing and technology transfer: how 
organizational context and available resources determine performance” 
2011/12, Duch-Brown, N.; García-Quevedo, J.; Montolio, D.: “The link between public support and private R&D 
effort: What is the optimal subsidy?” 
2011/13, Breuillé, M.L.; Duran-Vigneron, P.; Samson, A.L.: “To assemble to resemble? A study of tax disparities 
among French municipalities” 
2011/14, McCann, P.; Ortega-Argilés, R.: “Smart specialisation, regional growth and applications to EU cohesion 
policy” 
2011/15, Montolio, D.; Trillas, F.: “Regulatory federalism and industrial policy in broadband telecommunications” 
2011/16, Pelegrín, A.; Bolancé, C.: “Offshoring and company characteristics: some evidence from the analysis of 
Spanish firm data” 
2011/17, Lin, C.: “Give me your wired and your highly skilled: measuring the impact of immigration policy on 
employers and shareholders”  
2011/18, Bianchini, L.; Revelli, F.: “Green polities: urban environmental performance and government popularity” 
2011/19, López Real, J.: “Family reunification or point-based immigration system? The case of the U.S. and 
Mexico” 
2011/20, Bogliacino, F.; Piva, M.; Vivarelli, M.: “The impact of R&D on employment in Europe: a firm-level 
analysis” 
2011/21, Tonello, M.: “Mechanisms of peer interactions between native and non-native students: rejection or 
integration?” 
2011/22, García-Quevedo, J.; Mas-Verdú, F.; Montolio, D.: “What type of innovative firms acquire knowledge 
intensive services and from which suppliers?” 
2011/23, Banal-Estañol, A.; Macho-Stadler, I.; Pérez-Castrillo, D.: “Research output from university-industry 
collaborative projects” 
2011/24, Ligthart, J.E.; Van Oudheusden, P.: “In government we trust: the role of fiscal decentralization” 
2011/25, Mongrain, S.; Wilson, J.D.: “Tax competition with heterogeneous capital mobility” 
2011/26, Caruso, R.; Costa, J.; Ricciuti, R.: “The probability of military rule in Africa, 1970-2007” 
2011/27, Solé-Ollé, A.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: “Local spending and the housing boom” 
2011/28, Simón, H.; Ramos, R.; Sanromá, E.: “Occupational mobility of immigrants in a low skilled economy. The 
Spanish case” 
2011/29, Piolatto, A.; Trotin, G.: “Optimal tax enforcement under prospect theory” 
2011/30, Montolio, D; Piolatto, A.: “Financing public education when altruistic agents have retirement concerns” 
2011/31, García-Quevedo, J.; Pellegrino, G.; Vivarelli, M.: “The determinants of YICs’ R&D activity” 
2011/32, Goodspeed, T.J.: “Corruption, accountability, and decentralization: theory and evidence from Mexico” 
2011/33, Pedraja, F.; Cordero, J.M.: “Analysis of alternative proposals to reform the Spanish intergovernmental 
transfer system for municipalities” 
2011/34, Jofre-Monseny, J.; Sorribas-Navarro, P.; Vázquez-Grenno, J.: “Welfare spending and ethnic 
heterogeneity: evidence from a massive immigration wave” 
2011/35, Lyytikäinen, T.: “Tax competition among local governments: evidence from a property tax reform in 
Finland” 
2011/36, Brülhart, M.; Schmidheiny, K.: “Estimating the Rivalness of State-Level Inward FDI” 
2011/37, García-Pérez, J.I.; Hidalgo-Hidalgo, M.; Robles-Zurita, J.A.: “Does grade retention affect achievement? 
Some evidence from Pisa” 
2011/38, Boffa, f.; Panzar. J.: “Bottleneck co-ownership as a regulatory alternative” 
  
 
Documents de Treball de l’IEB 
 
2011/39, González-Val, R.; Olmo, J.: “Growth in a cross-section of cities: location, increasing returns or random 
growth?” 
2011/40, Anesi, V.; De Donder, P.: “Voting under the threat of secession: accommodation vs. repression” 
2011/41, Di Pietro, G.; Mora, T.: “The effect of the l’Aquila earthquake on labour market outcomes” 
2011/42, Brueckner, J.K.; Neumark, D.: “Beaches, sunshine, and public-sector pay: theory and evidence on 
amenities and rent extraction by government workers” 
2011/43, Cortés, D.: “Decentralization of government and contracting with the private sector” 
2011/44, Turati, G.; Montolio, D.; Piacenza, M.: “Fiscal decentralisation, private school funding, and students’ 
achievements. A tale from two Roman catholic countries” 
 
 
2012 
 
2012/1, Montolio, D.; Trujillo, E.: "What drives investment in telecommunications? The role of regulation, firms’ 
internationalization and market knowledge" 
2012/2, Giesen, K.; Suedekum, J.: "The size distribution across all “cities”: a unifying approach" 
2012/3, Foremny, D.; Riedel, N.: "Business taxes and the electoral cycle" 
2012/4, García-Estévez, J.; Duch-Brown, N.: "Student graduation: to what extent does university expenditure 
matter?" 
2012/5, Durán-Cabré, J.M.; Esteller-Moré, A.; Salvadori, L.: "Empirical evidence on horizontal competition in 
tax enforcement" 
2012/6, Pickering, A.C.; Rockey, J.: "Ideology and the growth of US state government" 
2012/7, Vergolini, L.; Zanini, N.: "How does aid matter? The effect of financial aid on university enrolment 
decisions" 
2012/8, Backus, P.: "Gibrat’s law and legacy for non-profit organisations: a non-parametric analysis" 
2012/9, Jofre-Monseny, J.; Marín-López, R.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: "What underlies localization and 
urbanization economies? Evidence from the location of new firms" 
2012/10, Mantovani, A.; Vandekerckhove, J.: "The strategic interplay between bundling and merging in 
complementary markets" 
2012/11, Garcia-López, M.A.: "Urban spatial structure, suburbanization and transportation in Barcelona" 
2012/12, Revelli, F.: "Business taxation and economic performance in hierarchical government structures" 
2012/13, Arqué-Castells, P.; Mohnen, P.: "Sunk costs, extensive R&D subsidies and permanent inducement 
effects" 
2012/14, Boffa, F.; Piolatto, A.; Ponzetto, G.: "Centralization and accountability: theory and evidence from the 
Clean Air Act" 
2012/15, Cheshire, P.C.; Hilber, C.A.L.; Kaplanis, I.: "Land use regulation and productivity – land matters: 
evidence from a UK supermarket chain" 
2012/16, Choi, A.; Calero, J.: "The contribution of the disabled to the attainment of the Europe 2020 strategy 
headline targets" 
2012/17, Silva, J.I.; Vázquez-Grenno, J.: "The ins and outs of unemployment in a two-tier labor market" 
2012/18, González-Val, R.; Lanaspa, L.; Sanz, F.: "New evidence on Gibrat’s law for cities" 
2012/19, Vázquez-Grenno, J.: "Job search methods in times of crisis: native and immigrant strategies in Spain" 
2012/20, Lessmann, C.: "Regional inequality and decentralization – an empirical analysis" 
2012/21, Nuevo-Chiquero, A.: "Trends in shotgun marriages: the pill, the will or the cost?" 
2012/22, Piil Damm, A.: "Neighborhood quality and labor market outcomes: evidence from quasi-random 
neighborhood assignment of immigrants" 
2012/23, Ploeckl, F.: "Space, settlements, towns: the influence of geography and market access on settlement 
distribution and urbanization" 
2012/24, Algan, Y.; Hémet, C.; Laitin, D.: "Diversity and local public goods: a natural experiment with exogenous 
residential allocation" 
2012/25, Martinez, D.; Sjögren, T.: "Vertical externalities with lump-sum taxes: how much difference does 
unemployment make?" 
2012/26, Cubel, M.; Sanchez-Pages, S.: "The effect of within-group inequality in a conflict against a unitary threat" 
2012/27, Andini, M.; De Blasio, G.; Duranton, G.; Strange, W.C.: "Marshallian labor market pooling: evidence 
from Italy" 
2012/28, Solé-Ollé, A.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: "Do political parties matter for local land use policies?" 
2012/29, Buonanno, P.; Durante, R.; Prarolo, G.; Vanin, P.: "Poor institutions, rich mines: resource curse and the 
origins of the Sicilian mafia" 
2012/30, Anghel, B.; Cabrales, A.; Carro, J.M.: "Evaluating a bilingual education program in Spain: the impact 
beyond foreign language learning" 
2012/31, Curto-Grau, M.; Solé-Ollé, A.; Sorribas-Navarro, P.: "Partisan targeting of inter-governmental transfers 
& state interference in local elections: evidence from Spain" 
  
 
Documents de Treball de l’IEB 
 
2012/32, Kappeler, A.; Solé-Ollé, A.; Stephan, A.; Välilä, T.: "Does fiscal decentralization foster regional 
investment in productive infrastructure?" 
2012/33, Rizzo, L.; Zanardi, A.: "Single vs double ballot and party coalitions: the impact on fiscal policy. Evidence 
from Italy" 
2012/34, Ramachandran, R.: "Language use in education and primary schooling attainment: evidence from a 
natural experiment in Ethiopia" 
2012/35, Rothstein, J.: "Teacher quality policy when supply matters" 
2012/36, Ahlfeldt, G.M.: "The hidden dimensions of urbanity" 
2012/37, Mora, T.; Gil, J.; Sicras-Mainar, A.: "The influence of BMI, obesity and overweight on medical costs: a 
panel data approach" 
2012/38, Pelegrín, A.; García-Quevedo, J.: "Which firms are involved in foreign vertical integration?" 
2012/39, Agasisti, T.; Longobardi, S.: "Inequality in education: can Italian disadvantaged students close the gap? A 
focus on resilience in the Italian school system" 
 
 
2013 
 
2013/1, Sánchez-Vidal, M.; González-Val, R.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: "Sequential city growth in the US: does age 
matter?" 
2013/2, Hortas Rico, M.: "Sprawl, blight and the role of urban containment policies. Evidence from US cities" 
2013/3, Lampón, J.F.; Cabanelas-Lorenzo, P-; Lago-Peñas, S.: "Why firms relocate their production overseas? 
The answer lies inside: corporate, logistic and technological determinants" 
2013/4, Montolio, D.; Planells, S.: "Does tourism boost criminal activity? Evidence from a top touristic country" 
2013/5, Garcia-López, M.A.; Holl, A.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: "Suburbanization and highways: when the Romans, 
the Bourbons and the first cars still shape Spanish cities" 
2013/6, Bosch, N.; Espasa, M.; Montolio, D.: "Should large Spanish municipalities be financially compensated? 
Costs and benefits of being a capital/central municipality" 
2013/7, Escardíbul, J.O.; Mora, T.: "Teacher gender and student performance in mathematics. Evidence from 
Catalonia" 
2013/8, Arqué-Castells, P.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: "Banking towards development: evidence from the Spanish 
banking expansion plan" 
2013/9, Asensio, J.; Gómez-Lobo, A.; Matas, A.: "How effective are policies to reduce gasoline consumption? 
Evaluating a quasi-natural experiment in Spain" 
2013/10, Jofre-Monseny, J.: "The effects of unemployment benefits on migration in lagging regions" 
2013/11, Segarra, A.; García-Quevedo, J.; Teruel, M.: "Financial constraints and the failure of innovation 
projects" 
2013/12, Jerrim, J.; Choi, A.: "The mathematics skills of school children: How does England compare to the high 
performing East Asian jurisdictions?" 
2013/13, González-Val, R.; Tirado-Fabregat, D.A.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: "Market potential and city growth: 
Spain 1860-1960" 
2013/14, Lundqvist, H.: "Is it worth it? On the returns to holding political office" 
2013/15, Ahlfeldt, G.M.; Maennig, W.: "Homevoters vs. leasevoters: a spatial analysis of airport effects" 
2013/16, Lampón, J.F.; Lago-Peñas, S.: "Factors behind international relocation and changes in production 
geography in the European automobile components industry" 
2013/17, Guío, J.M.; Choi, A.: "Evolution of the school failure risk during the 2000 decade in Spain: analysis of 
Pisa results with a two-level logistic mode" 
2013/18, Dahlby, B.; Rodden, J.: "A political economy model of the vertical fiscal gap and vertical fiscal 
imbalances in a federation" 
2013/19, Acacia, F.; Cubel, M.: "Strategic voting and happiness" 
2013/20, Hellerstein, J.K.; Kutzbach, M.J.; Neumark, D.: "Do labor market networks have an important spatial 
dimension?" 
2013/21, Pellegrino, G.; Savona, M.: "Is money all? Financing versus knowledge and demand constraints to 
innovation" 
2013/22, Lin, J.: "Regional resilience" 
2013/23, Costa-Campi, M.T.; Duch-Brown, N.; García-Quevedo, J.: "R&D drivers and obstacles to innovation in 
the energy industry" 
2013/24, Huisman, R.; Stradnic, V.; Westgaard, S.: "Renewable energy and electricity prices: indirect empirical 
evidence from hydro power" 
2013/25, Dargaud, E.; Mantovani, A.; Reggiani, C.: "The fight against cartels: a transatlantic perspective" 
2013/26, Lambertini, L.; Mantovani, A.: "Feedback equilibria in a dynamic renewable resource oligopoly: pre-
emption, voracity and exhaustion" 
  
 
Documents de Treball de l’IEB 
 
2013/27, Feld, L.P.; Kalb, A.; Moessinger, M.D.; Osterloh, S.: "Sovereign bond market reactions to fiscal rules 
and no-bailout clauses – the Swiss experience" 
2013/28, Hilber, C.A.L.; Vermeulen, W.: "The impact of supply constraints on house prices in England" 
2013/29, Revelli, F.: "Tax limits and local democracy" 
2013/30, Wang, R.; Wang, W.: "Dress-up contest: a dark side of fiscal decentralization" 
2013/31, Dargaud, E.; Mantovani, A.; Reggiani, C.: "The fight against cartels: a transatlantic perspective" 
 
Fiscal Federalism 
